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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O·F· THE STATE Q~F UTAH 
~IARY ~I. STROUD, 
Petitioner, 
-vs.-
INDUSTRIAL COMl\iiSSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, and 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORA-
TION, a municipal corporation, 
Defenda;nts. 
Case No. 
7687 
Brief of Petitioner 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The petitioner is the widow of Thomas William 
Stroud, who was killed when his gun accidentally dis-
charged. Mr. Stroud was employed by Salt Lake City 
Corporation as a police officer. The petitioner applied 
for compensation. After a contested hearing compensa-
tion was denied and the petitioner brings this review. 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR 
Petitioner contends that the Industrial Commission 
erred: 
1. In concluding that the accident which caused 
Mr. Stroud's death did not arise out of his employment. 
2. In concluding that the accident did not occur in 
the course of the employment. 
THE FACTS 
The facts brought out at the conte-sted hearing are 
not in dispute. It is admitted that Thomas Stroud was 
employed by Salt Lake City as a policeman (R. 6 and 
7); that Salt Lake City was subject to the Workmen's 
Compensation Act (R. 6); that Thomas Stroud was 
killed by the discharge of his gun on January 5, 1951, 
at about 6:00 p.m. (R. 6, 7, 11). It was agreed that the 
only issue for determination was whether or not Stroud 
was killed by accident which (a) arose out of his em-
ployment, or (b) occurred in the course of his employ-
ment. (R. 7). 
Stroud was subject to call 24 hours per day. He 
had an assigned shift which required him to work spe-
cific hours of each day and gave him one day off per 
week (R. 8, 10, 13, 6). The day of the accident was his 
usual day off (R. 13, 14, 33). He was a sergeant with 
the duty of supervising the work of several policemen 
(R. 14, 16, 17). On the previous day he had arranged 
with two officers to come to the police station at 6:00 
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p.m. the following day, at which time and place he was 
to check out for them a special police car. (R. 14, 15, 17, 
18). The car in question was one without any equipment 
to identify it as a police car, and it had to be specially 
checked out (R. 36). Both of these officers testified that 
on Thursday Stroud requested them to meet him at the 
station at 6:00 p.m., Friday, so that he could get the car 
for them (R. 15, 17, 18, 28). Stroud also mentioned to 
Officer Brinton that he was going to arrange for the car 
(R. 36). There is no eYidence to the contrary. On Friday, 
Officer Stroud arrived at the station just before 6:00 
p.m. He was seen in street clothes at his desk a short 
time before the accident, which happened at about 6 :00 
p.m. (R. 29, 30). 
The two officers who were to meet Officer Stroud 
at the station at 6 :00 p.m. were sent to Fort Douglas 
on special business and, therefore, did not arrive until 
after the accident (R. 15, 16, 28). Officer Stroud did not 
in fact check the car out for them (R. 19, 36). Officer 
Stroud was killed when his gun fell while he was lifting 
some cases of Coca-Cola from a patrol car into his own 
private car. He intended to take the Coca-Cola to a 
police benefit party (R. 11, 12, 13). The gun with which 
he was killed was not the regular service revolver issued 
by Salt Lake City, but was an automatic pistol owned 
by him (R. 12, 14, 27). It was, however, the pistol which 
he customarily carried (R. 10, 31). 
The evidence was undisputed that Salt Lake City 
police officers customarily carry a gun with them at all 
times, whether they are on or off duty (R. 9, 10, 20, 23, 
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25, 28). Such has been the custom for at least twenty 
years (R. 26). One of the witnesses testified that as a 
part of the indoctrination training for new policemen, 
he was told by the instructors that he was to carry his 
gun at all times (R. 22). Chief Crowther testified that 
he was told when he first became connected with the 
police department that he was expected to carry a gun 
(R. 25). There is no rule in the police manual requiring 
officers to carry guns. 
Still the only conclusion which could possibly be 
drawn from the evidence is that it was a uniform cus-
tom of police officers working for Salt Lake City to 
carry guns while off duty (R. 9, 10, 20, 23, 25, 28). 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT 
SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN 
FAVOR OF COMPENSATION. 
In compensation cases the Utah Supreme Court has 
uniformly held that all doubtful cases should be resolved 
in favor of awarding compensation. See M. & K. Cor-
poration v. Industrial Commission, 112 Utah 488, 189 P. 
2nd 132, Charndler v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 
213, 184 P. 1020. 
In the M. & K. Corporation case, the court said: 
''We have also repeatedly held that this sta-
tute should be liberally construed and if there is 
any doubt respecting the right to compensation 
it should be resolved in favor of a recovery." 
(Citing many cases.) 
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~. rXDER UTAH STATUrrES COl\1Pl1~NSATION 
SHOULD BE A\YAHDED IF EITHER (A) rrHE 
ACCIDEXT ARISES OUT OF THE El\IPLOY-
:JlEXT, OR (B) IN THE COURSE OF rrriE El\1-
PLOY:JIEXT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held many times that 
because of a 1919 amendment to what is now Section 
-1::2-1-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, it is only necessary 
to show either one of two things: (a) That the accident 
arose out of the employment, or (b) That it occurred in 
the course of his employment. Prior to 1919 the Section 
used the word "and", but in 1919 the Legislature sub-
stituted the word "or" and since that date this court 
has consistently held that only one or the other need be 
shown. This is pointed out in numerous cases, one of 
the more recent being M. & K. Corporation, supra, 112 
rtah 488, in ·which the court says: 
''Since the 1919 amendment to that section 
(42-1-43) when the word 'or' which we have 
italicized above was substituted for the word' and' 
it is not necessary for the accident to arise both 
out of and occur in the course of his employment, 
it is sufficient if the accident only arises in the 
course of his employment. Workmen's Compen-
sation statutes both in this country and through-
out the British Empire usually require, as did 
ours before the amendment, that the accident 
arise both out of and in the course of the employ-
ment, and this must be kept in mind in consider-
ing the decisions of other jurisdictions. We haYe 
often pointed out this distinction and indicated 
in many cases that the recovery was allowed on 
that account and that it probably would not have 
been allowed without the amendment.'' 
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There are numerous Utah cases to the same effect. 
See Tavey v. Industrial Commission, 106 Utah 489, 150 
P. 2nd 379; Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 103 Utah 64, 133 P. 2nd 314; Cudahy 
Packing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 161, 207 
P. 148, and other cases cited therein. 
3. THE ACCIDENT INVOLVED HERE AROSE 
OUT OF TIIE EMPLOYMENT. 
We believe that a reading of the decision of the In-
dustrial Commission will demonstrate that the Indus-
trial Commission concerned itself primarily, if not ex-
clusively, with the question of whether or not Stroud 
was in the course of his employment when killed. It 
concluded that he was not, because it was his day off, 
and because the loading of soda water into his own car 
was neAt a part of his employer's business. For the pur-
pose of our argument under this point, let it be conceded 
that Stroud was not in the course of his employment 
when killed. The Utah Statutes, nevertheless, under the 
cases cited in Point 2 hereof, allow recovery if the acci-
dent which resulted in Stroud's death "arose out of his 
employment.'' 
We submit that except for the fact that Stroud 
carried a gun, he would never have been killed. The 
cases cited hereinafter will demonstrate that it is not 
necessary for the employer to specifically require the 
employee to carry a gun. All that is required is that the 
carrying of a gun be reasonably related or incident to 
the employment. If it is, and death results from an acci-
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dent with the gun, all of the cases hold that the accident 
"arises out of the ernployme,ut." 
There are literally hundreds of cases defining the 
term "arising out of the employment". This court has 
considered the phrase on numerous occasions. We will 
not lengthen this brief with detailed definitions of that 
term. The ca~es are uniform to the effect that the words 
''arising out of'' are construed to refer to the origin or 
cause of the injury, and involve the idea that the accident 
is in some sense due to or caused by the employment, 
and the words "in the course of" refer to the time, 
place and cirrumstances under which it occurred. See 
Ctah Apex Jlining Compa;ny v. Industrial Commission, 
67 Utah 537, 248 P. 493; M. db K. Corporation v. Indus-
trial Commission, supra. 
If the employment subjects the employee to risks 
which are different from or greater than those to which 
the public is subjected, and those dangers result in an 
accidental injury, then the accident arises out of the 
employment. For example, in the Cudahy Packing Co. 
v. Industrial Commission case, 60 Utah 161, 207 P. 148, 
the court held that an employee injured while going to 
work was injured by accident arising out of the employ-
ment, because in going to work he was required to go 
down a particular lane and cross a series of railroad 
tracks to reach his employer's place of business. There 
was no other way that the employee could get to his 
work. By taking the only lane available to him, he was 
subjected to the dangers incident to crossing railroad 
tracks. rrhis court held that because his employment 
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subjected him to that danger, his death, caused by col-
lision with a train, arose out of his employment, even 
though he had not yet arrived at work, and even though 
it was before his working hours started. 
In Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 103 Utah 64, 133 P. 2nd 314, the court per-
mitted an employee who had left work and was on his 
way home to recover workmen's compensation because 
he was exposed to certain dangers in crossing the public 
highway to get to a parking lot. The court cited the 
Cudahy Packing Company case and emphasized the fact 
that it was his employment which subjected him to the 
particular risk. The court distinguished cases from 
other jurisdictions which require, contrary to the Utah 
law, that the accident also occur in the course of the 
employment. The court said that the fact that the 
d~nger was one to which the employee was subjected by 
reason of his employment, demonstrated that the acci-
dent arising out of said danger arose out of the employ-
ment. 
Officer Stroud was exposed to the dangers of a gun 
accident by his employment. There certainly can be no 
doubt under the evidence that he carried the gun because 
of his employment as a police officer. (R. 9, 10, 20, 23, 
25, 28). In fact, the carrying of the gun without a permit 
would have been illegal except for the fact that he was 
employed as a policeman. See Section 103-21-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943. All of the officers carried guns 
on their days off and such practice was not only known 
by the police department, but was encouraged by it. (R. 
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9, 10, ~0, ~3. ~3, 28) Under tht> cases which are cited 
hereafter, it is clear that this is sufficient to show that 
the accident arose out of his employment. 
There haYe been numerous cases in which employees 
haYe been injured in gun accidents. The cases recognize 
that persons who handle firearms are subjected to the 
risk of being accidentally shot. If the possession of 
firearms is reasonably related to or incident to the em-
ployment, then any accident resulting from use or pos-
session of said firearms is held to arise out of the em-
ployment. If, however, the presence of a gun has no 
relationship whatever to the employment, then even 
though the accident occurs while the employee is actually 
performing his master's services, (in course of employ-
ment) the accident does not "arise out of the employ-
ment.'' 
(a) Cases in Which Courts Have Held that Gun 
Accidents Arise Out of the Employment. 
The only Utah case dealing directly with this 
point is Beaver City v. Industrial Commission, 67 
"Utah 8, 245 P. 378. Here the Beaver City Marshall, 
who was on call 24 hours per day dropped his gun 
in the mud while chasing cattle out of a city park. 
That evening he was cleaning the gun at his home 
and was hurt when it accidentally discharged. There 
was no evidence as to whose gun it was. The court 
said, however, that this made no difference. The 
court did not attempt to distinguish between '' aris-
ing out of" or "in the course of" the employment, 
but said that because he was cleaning his gun he 
was in the course of his employment and was entitled 
to compensation. Because the Utah law permits re-
covery upon the showing of either one, the court 
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did not go further and consider whether or not the 
accident also arose out of the employment. 
In the case of Mayor v. Ward, 114 S.W. 804, a 
policeman was subject to call 24 hours per day, but 
he worked a regular shift which ended at midnight. 
On the day in question he stopped work at midnight 
and thereafter left the station for his home. Sev-
eral blocks from the police station he was struck by 
a car. He was wearing a gun at the time. He fell 
on his left side, and because of the fact that he was 
wearing the gun on that side, he received internal 
injuries. The court thought it clear that but for the 
gun he would not have received such injuries. Said 
the court: 
''Moreover, we think the fair inference is 
that Ward's injury to his left side, twhich ap-
pears to have done serious internal damage, 
was the direct result of his having his pistol in 
its scabbard in the position shown; that the 
violent fall of this heavy man on this object 
attached to his side was the cause of the injury. 
It thus appears that his carrying of this 
weapon, which his duty required, was the direct 
cause of his injury; that the instrumentality 
which proximately produced the injury was one 
which he was required to use to perform his 
duty. If this gun had been exploded by his fall 
and wounded hi1n fatally, could it be contended 
that his injury did not arise out of his employ-
ment?'' 
In Goins v. Shreveport Yellow Cabs, (La.) 200 
So. 481, the petitioner was a cab driver. Because 
of occasional robberies and current strike troubles, 
the employer supplied pistols to his employees. The 
court noted : 
''The drivers were not compelled to carry 
revolvers, but the evidence leaves us satisfied 
10 
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that they were encouraged to have these 
weapons for defense of themselves as well ns 
the property of the defendant company." 
The employee was waiting in his cab for a call 
from passengers and while so waiting he and an-
other employee began comparing guns. One of them 
accidentally discharged and injured the petitioner. 
The court held that the shooting arose out of the 
employment and analyzed numerous shooting cases. 
The court said : 
"Ordinarily, plaintiff's employment as a cab 
driver might not expose him to the danger of 
accidental shooting any more than had he not 
been so employed, but where the employer fur-
nishes his employee with a revolver for the two-
fold purpose of protecting him and the property 
of the employer from robberies, kidnappers 
and possible trouble from striking drivers, he 
is exposed to the danger of accidental shooting. 
Necessarily, the employee would be called upon 
to handle the pistol other than when actual 
danger was present. As the court said in the 
Brown case, we would be indulging in hair-
splitting distinctions which would be without 
foundation in law or fact, should we hold under 
the facts of this case that the injury did not 
arise out of and in the course of plaintiff's em-
ployment.'' 
In Holland v. Continental Casualty Co., (La.) 155 
So. 63, petitioner was a traveling salesman. He car-
ried valuables and to protect them he carried a gun. 
The gun was his own gun. The employer knew that 
the petitioner customarily carried the gun. While 
stopped at a filling station the plaintiff picked up 
the gun and while in the act of removing a shell from 
it, accidentally shot himself in the foot. The em-
ployer contended that this did not arise out of the 
employment. The court held that it did and said: 
11 
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"It cannot well be argued that in view of 
the character of the plaintiff's duty, that of car-
rying in his car merchandise of considerable 
value and cash and checks collected from custo-
mers, he was not necessarily exposed to greater 
risks and damages from robbers and highway-
men, who, of late years ply their trade bodily 
than he would be had he not been so employed. 
This, as we understand the law is the true test." 
The court went on to note that because the carry-
ing of the gun was not unreasonable and that he was 
injured by the gun "carried to prevent being robbed 
and perhaps injured, it seems clear to us that the 
case is compensable.'' 
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, (Ala.) 32 So. 
2nd 666. The deceased was employed as a night 
watchman. He usually carried a .45 caliber gun of 
his own, but the company had furnished a .32 caliber 
pistol which was kept on the premises for use 
by him or by other employees for protecting the 
employer's property. The watchman was friendly 
with a very young son of his supervisor. He took 
the boy to his office to get a holster from the .32 
caliber gun so that the boy could use it for his toy 
gun. He took the .32 caliber gun from the holster 
and placed the boy's toy gun in it. The boy picked 
up the .32 caliber gun and shot and killed the watch-
man. The court said that the question in shooting 
cases of this type is whether the accident ''arose 
out of the employment.'' After reviewing several 
cases the court said: 
"In the instant case the employee's death 
was caused by the accidental discharge of a 
pistol which he used with the knowledge and 
consent of the company officers in connection 
with the performance of his duties. When guns 
are handled, shooting accidents may be ex-
12 
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pected. Such an accident is unquestionably a 
hazard peculiar to the employment of a watch-
man or other person whose duties require the 
use of firearms. The duties of his employment 
subjected him to this hazard to which he would 
not haYe been exposed apart from his employ-
ment. It is such a hazard as can be said to be 
a natural consequence of the employment. A 
firearm is a dangerous instrumentality * * * It 
was by reason of his employment that the de-
ceased was exposed to the danger incident to 
the handling and carrying of pistols, and the 
hazard of being shot by the accidental discharge 
of the pistols was unquestionably a natural in-
cident to his work.'' 
In Comstock v. Bivens, (Col.) 78 Col. 107, 239 P. 
869, a mailman carrying mail for a company having 
a contract on a star route was injured in a gun acci-
dent. He carried the gun because of the fact that 
he had a route in sparsely populated areas. The 
court said that while he was not required by his 
employment to carry it, it was customary for mail-
men in sparsely populated areas to carry a gun. He 
had gone home for the night and was killed in front 
of his home while removing the gun from the truck. 
The court held that the accident arose out of his 
employment. 
McDaniel v. City of Benson, 167 Minn. 407, 209 
N.W. 26. There the sole police officer of a city went 
to his home to get a revolver. He placed the same 
in a shoulder holster. He then stooped over for 
some purpose and the gun discharged when it fell 
to the floor. He died from the resulting injuries. 
The court held that the accident arose out of his 
employment. 
Security State Bank of Sterling v. Propst, 99 Col. 
67, 59 P. 2nd 798. The deceased was assistant cashier 
13 
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of a bank. With the knowledge of the bank, he 
carried a gun. He often brought deposits to the 
bank from his home. The morning of the accident 
he was carrying a bank deposit but stopped to mail 
a letter. (Not in any way connected with the bank.) 
The gun was discharged while he was stopped and 
he died of the injuries thus sustained. The employer 
claimed that he was neither in the course of his 
employment, nor killed by accident arising out of 
the employment. The court held that the mailing 
of the letter was not a departure and then expressly 
held that since he was carrying a gun with the 
knowledge of his employer, even though no express 
permission or instruction had been given him, the 
carrying of the gun was connected with his employ-
ment and death from it arose out of his employment. 
Gallaher v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (Tex-
as) 77 S.W. 2d 312. An employee attended two oil 
wells and lived on the premises of his employer near 
one of them. He kept a gun for his own personal 
use and also to protect the employer's property. He 
was on call 24 hours per day. At the time of the 
accident the gun was in his car at the place where 
he lived. He was cleaning a tank for his employer. 
The needed rags were in his car. While getting them 
he caused the gun to discharge and was injured. The 
court discussed at length the meaning of the phrase 
"arising out of employment", and concluded that 
the gun was connected with or incidental to the 
employment, and that the accident for that reason 
arose out of the employment. Said the court: 
''The words 'out of' point to the origin and 
cause of the accident or injury; the words 'in 
the course of' to the time, place and circum-
stances under which the accident or injury takes 
place. The character or quality of the accident 
as conveyed by the words 'out of' involves the 
idea that the accident is in some sense due to 
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the employment. It must result from a risk 
reasonably incident to the employment • • •. 
"The rights of appellant depend upon the 
reasonableness under all the circumstances of 
his action in having the gun with him * * *. 
"Gallaher was in the sense a watchman. 
• • * X o orders had been issued preventing 
him from carrying firearms and the evidence 
indicates that the company rather expected him 
to arm himself, if necessary, to protect the 
property.'' 
The above cases cite many other similar cases. 
Where the nature of the employment is such that the 
employee might reasonably carry a gun, the courts are 
uniform in holding that an injury from the gun arises 
out of the employment. Since that is all that is neces-
sary in Utah, the petitioner was entitled to an award. 
Certainly, it was not unreasonable for Stroud to carry 
a gun on his off-duty hours. There are at least four of 
the cases cited above which expressly hold that it is not 
necessary for the employer to order the employee to 
carry a gun. It is sufficient if the employer knows that 
the employee is carrying one and that the carrying of a 
gun might reasonably further the employer's interests. 
Here the employer both knew of the custom and encour-
aged it. (R. 9, 10, 20, 23, 25, 28) 
We think in so far as the term ''arise out of the em-
ployment" is concerned, that it is immaterial that the 
accident happened at the police station. Had Stroud 
been killed at home by a gun kept by him for use in the 
performance of his employment, the accident would have 
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arisen out of the employment. In proving that an acci-
dent arises in the course of the employment, the time, 
place and circumstances are important. But, an accident 
may arise out of the employment, even though the em-
ployee is not at work and is not performing his employ-
er's work. There are numerous cases which have sus-
tained the proposition that an employee assaulted after 
he has returned to his home at night from causes which 
had their origin in his employment is injured from 
causes arising out of his employment. See, for example, 
the cases collected by Howitz on Workmen's Compen-
sation, commencing on page 507, as cited with approval 
by the Utah Supreme Court in the M. & K. Corporation 
case, supra. 
(b) The Industrial Commission's Opinion 
The Industrial Commission went astray because it 
focused its attention on the fact that Stroud was off 
duty at the moment of the injury. The opinion of the 
Industrial Commission emphasizes the fact that it was 
Stroud's day off and that at the time of the accident he 
was not performing an act connected with or incidental 
to his duty. The Commission goes on to say that it is 
generally agreed that if an employee on 24 hour call 
has been called by his employer and is killed going to 
or from work, his dependents are entitled to compen-
sation. If applicant must found his case on a contention 
that the injury occurred in the course of his employment, 
all this would be of critical importance. But here the 
primary contention of the applicant is that Stroud's 
employment subjected him to dangers different frcm 
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and greater than those of the public in general. His em-
ployment required him to have firearms available. (R. 
23) He was exposed both on and off duty to the risks 
of a gun accident. It was necessary for him to handle 
firearms on his off-duty hours. (R. 25) Whenever he 
went home he would be required to put his gun away 
and to get it again when he left for work. In view of 
the encouragement from Salt Lake City Police Depart-
ment, it was not unreasonable for him to be carrying 
the gun, even though off duty. Certainly, the keeping 
of firearms was an incident of his employment and his 
death resulted from a firearm kept by him to perform 
the duties of his employment. This the Commission 
does not consider nor discuss. The accident was directly 
related to his employment and arose out of it. 
(c) It is Immaterial That the Gwn Was Not Owned 
By Salt Lake City. 
At the hearing the city brought out the fact that 
the gun which caused the death was not the gun regu-
larly issued by Salt Lake City. (R. 12, 194) In Beaver 
City v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 8, 245 P. 378, 
the Utah Supreme Court expressly held that this was 
immaterial. Other states have held to the same effect. 
See for example, Frank v. Point Marion Bridge Co., 128 
Pa. Sup. 269, 193 Atl. 421. There an employee was killed 
by a borrowed .22 caliber rifle. The deceased had a com-
pany revolver, but was not using it. The court said that 
the fact that it was a borrowed gun, rather than the one 
the company had issued, was immaterial. See also Com-
stock v. Bevins, 78 Col. 107, 239 P. 869; Security State 
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Bank of Sterling v. Propst, 99 Col 67, 59 P. 2nd 798, in 
both of which the employee w~.s carrying his own gun 
rather than one issued or furnished by the employer. 
(d) It is Immaterial That the Employer Did Not Order 
Stroud to Carry the Gun. 
Many of the cases cited above expressly comment 
on the fact that the injured employee was not ''required'' 
to carry the gun. These cases state that the employee 
is allowed considerable latitude in selecting the means 
by which he performs his employer's business. If the 
carrying of a gun might reasonably promote the em-
ployer's business, that is sufficient. The following cases 
comment upon the fact that the employer did not require 
the carrying of a gun but merely acquiesced in it: Goins 
v. Shreveport Yellow Cabs, 200 So. 481; Holland v. Con-
tinental Casualty Co., 155 So. 63; Comstock v. Bevins, 78 
Col. 107, 239 P. 869; Security State Bank of Sterling v. 
Propst, 99 Colo. 67, 59 P. 2nd 798; Gallaher v. U. S. 
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 77 S.W. 2nd 312. 
4. STROUD WAS IN THE COURSE OF HIS EM-
PLOYMENT. 
In arguing this point, we again emphasize the fact 
that it is not necessary for the court to hold that Stroud 
was both in the course of his employment and killed by 
accident arising out of his employment. Either one will 
suffice. We submit that in this instance both are present. 
We feel that the Industrial Commission focused its atten-
was in the course of his employment. Because it was his 
tion solely upon the question of whether or not Stroud 
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day off and because at the moment of the injury he was 
not directly engaged in work which furthered the em-
ployer's interests, the Commission concluded that he was 
not in the course of his employment. \Ve believe that 
this was an immaterial departure from the business 
which brought Stroud to the police station on the day 
of the accident, and that he was in the course of his 
employment. HoweYer, if the court should conclude that 
this is not so, we nevertheless urge that he was killed 
by accident arising out of his employment, which is all 
that we are required to show. 
The evidence is uncontradicted that Stroud was a 
sergeant in charge of a group of police officers. He had 
made an appointment with two officers to meet him at 
the station at 6:00. (R. 15, 17, 18, 28) His intention was 
to be at the station himself to check out for them a special 
car. He was seen at his desk immediately before the 
accident. (R. 29, 30) The evidence is uncontradicted that 
he came to the station to check out this special car for 
the two officers who were to meet him at 6:00 there. (R. 
15, 17, 18, 28) Certainly he was in his employer's business 
and at the station for that purpose While waiting for 
these two officers to come in he went from the station 
to lift soda water bottles from an officer's car to his 
own car. (R. 11, 12, 13) Admittedly, this particular act 
was not in furtherance of the employer's business. ( R. 
11, 12, 13) He was, however, at the station to perform 
the employer's business and this is in our opinion the 
important factor. (R. 15, 17, 18, 28) While at the station 
to perform the employer's business, he certainly could 
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move about the station for personal matters without 
leaving the course of his employment. Had he completed 
the business of checking out the special car and then 
become engaged in arrangements for the policeman's 
party, we think he would have left the course of his em-
ployment. However, he had not completed the task 
which brought him to the station. (R. 15) He was waiting 
for the officers who were late coming in for the agreed 
a~pointment. (R. 15) It seems to us highly unreasonable 
to restrict his activity at the station to matters which 
furthered the employer's business, so that any depar-
ture like washing his hands, combing his hair, or en-
gaging in social conversation carries him out of his 
employment. The Utah Court has never in the past 
adhered to such narrow rules insofar as departure from 
employment is concerned. We emphasize the fact that 
he was at the station to further the employer's business 
and had not completed his work in that regard. (R. 15, 
17, 18, 28) We think that this placed him in the course 
of his employment and that the excursion to the patrol 
car to get the soda water was not a departure. The 
important cases on departure are Twin Peaks Ca;n;ning 
Compa;ny v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 589, 196 P. 
853; Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 
581, 137 P. 2nd 364; and IYI. & K. Corporation v. Indus-
trial Commission, 112 Utah 488. See also Smith v. Uni-
versity of Idaho, 170 P. 2nd 404; Dunphy v. Augustia 
College of Villanova, 195 Atl. 782; Sweat v. Allen, 200 
So. 348; Sta.te Road Commission v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 56 Utah 252. 
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SU 1\ll\IARY 
\Ye base our case primarily on the contention that 
Stroud was killed by accident arising "out of" his em-
ployment. He was killed by a gun carried because he 
was employed as a policeman. He was encouraged by 
his employer to carry a gun even while off duty. ~ 
he was going to the police station to check out a car 
clearly an act for his employer's benefit, and while going 
to the station to do that work be did not act unreasonably 
in carrying his gun. The accident had its origin and 
cause in his employment and it, therefore, ''arose out 
of'' it, even if he had departed from his employment and 
hence was not "in the course of" his employment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE, 
Attorney for Petitioner. 
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